A purely inter-model version of a machine intelligence benchmark would allow us to measure intelligence directly as information without projecting that information onto labeled datasets. We propose a framework in which other learners measure the informational significance of their peers across a network and use a digital ledger to negotiate the scores. However, the main benefits of measuring intelligence with other learners are lost if the underlying scores are dishonest. As a solution, we show how competition for connectivity in the network can be used to force honest bidding. We first prove that selecting inter-model scores using gradient descent is a regret-free strategy: one which generates the best subjective outcome regardless of the behavior of others. We then empirically show that when nodes apply this strategy, the network converges to a ranking that correlates with the one found in a fully coordinated and centralized setting. The result is a fair mechanism for training an internet-wide, decentralized and incentivized machine learning system. Such a system produces -on an ongoing basis -a continually hardening and expanding benchmark at the generalized intersection of the participants.
Introduction
Almost exclusively, best-in-class machine learning systems require knowledge previously extracted from datasets: representations of inputs which are semantic, dis-joint, causal, and general enough to tackle a wide variety of problems [1, 2] . The production of this form of intelligence globally, however, still relies on a feedback mechanism which benchmarks it against specific tasks, rather than in knowledge directly [3] . Since the mechanism is misaligned to the salient feature being produced, a large portion of work is lost. Niche intelligence systems are not really possible for instance, since they would need to improve the tasks in totality before they were valued. Indeed, all work that it is not currently stateof-the-art is pruned this way. The low-resolution is further compounded by its lack of breadth: the narrowness of the domain described by the tasks make it easier for models to buy progress without improved general-understanding [4] . Nor can we measure how much one team's model could improve another. This ensures the field is inherently non-collaborative, with the majority of researchers world-wide in essence pitted against each other [5] . Ultimately, the only users capable of creating the systems with high performance are those with the means and resources to train the largest models.
The aim in this paper is to show how a collective of intelligence systems could be used to evaluate their peers. Crucially, the measure of intelligence is with respect to intelligence itself, in information-theoretic terms, rather than via a projection onto labeled datasets. Moreover, models share knowledge with each other and it can compound in the system without needing to be relearned by every new model. In essence the benchmark is an intelligence market which rewards models who improve knowledge within it. 1 We design the benchmark to run in a continuous, asynchronous fashion, peer-to-peer (p2p) fashion across the internet. Any number of supervised or unsupervised tasks, engineers, or connected computers can be added concurrently. Since this introduces trustless computation 2 , we also dedicate a part of this paper to explaining how the system remains fair when little assurance can be given about the computers which compose it.
Method

Benchmark
The network is composed by n unique parameterized functions F = f 0 , ..., f j , ...f n where each function is producing an output tensor f i (F (x)), a 'representation' from an input tensor F (x) = [f 0(x) ...f n(x) ] gathered by querying its neighbors. Each function is training asynchronously over a dataset D i = [X, Y ] such that, given an error function Q i , its expectation over that data E Di defines a loss L i = E Di [Q i ( y, f i (F (x)) )]. We assume these losses are measured on the same scale and thus our benchmark B can be defined by their sum: Each parameterized function is represented here in its most abstract sense [6] and need only accept the same input type x and produce the same output dimension to fit within the network. For instance, unicode encoded strings x, and responses: their semantic representations within some standard dimension. This widened scope ensures participants can be multi-task [7] , use completely distinct computing substrates [8] or train on unique datasets. [9] .
Ideal Ranking
Our goal in this work is to produce a ranking R = [R i ] over these functions where the score R i ∈ R represents participant i's information-theoretic significance to the benchmark B. Following Le Cun and others [10, 11] , it is reasonable to analytically define this significance by equating it with the cost of removing each component from the network:
Where the above is derived using a Taylor series (Appendix 6.1) and ∆F (x) i is the perturbation of the inputs when removing function f i at the point x. Note, the linear and higher order terms of the Taylor series have been removed following [11] and the remaining term H(Q i ) is the hessian of our error function. When the error function Q is the twice-differentiable cross-entropy, then H(Q i ) is the Fisher information matrix, and R i ∈ R is measured as relative entropy: reflects each participants informational significance to the network as a whole.
Inter Ranking
It is not possible to compute the ranking score above without access to the parameters of each function in the network. Instead, we use a set of inter-model weights W = [w ij ] where each w i,j is the score attributed to f j from f i combined into an n × n square matrix.
w0,5, w5,0 The weights can be computed on the fly either approximately [11] , or by using the full hessian of the error. We store them on a distributed ledger and allow participants to update them by making changes of bounded size: W t+1 = W t + λ∆W , where ||W i || 2 < at block step t. We also enforce that the scores in each row sum to 1, ||w|| 1 = 1. The equivalent ranking R (2) can then be computed by normalizing column sum of the weight matrix:
The problem is of course is that without system-wide access to the model parameters the computation of w ij (3) is non-auditable. It is reasonable to assume participants will select weights which artificially increase their own rank rather than others in the network. Moreover, since the network remains open, participants may choose to create many spuriously neighbours and rank themselves higher. The remainder of this paper describes our proposal for resolving these issues.
Stake
The proposed solution begins by introducing a finite resource S = [s i ], a component's 'stake' in the system, and an inflation mechanism τ which translates the ranking vector R into additional stake as incentive.
The • here is the Hadamard product between the n × n matrix W and the n × n matrix containing S in each column, and t is the time-step referred to in Section 2.3 (measured in distinct blocks on the distributed ledger). By design (5) increases the importance of those with stake, s 0 * w ij . This serves two purposes: (1) since it is finite, new computers cannot spuriously create nodes to game the ranking, and (2) the resource provides mechanism power. By providing it to nodes with large rank, this ensures that those with weight must have worked to attain it, or indirectly subsidized those who have done so already. A single staked token would be enough to bootstrap the process. 3
Algorithm 1 Inflation mechanism
Require: S = [n × 1] Stake Vector Require: W = [n × n] Weight Matrix Require: τ > 0 inflation rate while TRUE do W = W + λ∆W R = 1 n W T • S * 1 S = S + τ * R ||R||2 end while
Competitive weights
While stake provides some protection against malicious actors, it does not ensure weights are set accurately. Our solution begins by introducing competition for connectivity within the network. Nodes that underweight are punished by having inputs from the network masked to zero (7) . To frame this market we borrow the continuous differential activation function σ with range (0, 1). Under a choice of weights W i the inputs to component i are:
Here, the shift term µ j is the average of the weights in each column µ j = ( 1 n ) n i s i * w i,j , and the activation function is the temperature scaled sigmoid. Because the allocation mechanism is standard across the network it is possible for each participants to compute both ∂Li ∂Wi and ∂Ri ∂Wi . Computers may augment their usual training framework, for instance, Tensorflow, with the allocation mechanism shown here.
Running the network
The steps to run a network participant are: 6 Participants disconnect and verify the model in a normal manner.
Peers only communicate with computers that hold stake as a consequence of section 2.5. Those that fail to produce value will be pruned naturally as participants learn to differentiate signal from noise.
Conditional computation
As the network grows, outward bandwidth will become the major bottleneck. Components learn to trim outward bandwidth by employing a Sparsely-Gated Mixture-of-Experts (SGMoE) [13] layer at the input. The gating layer determines a sparse combination of children to query for each example and then re-joins them using the the gating weights g j (x). The combined gated inputs are fed as input to the local function:
The layer cuts outward bandwidth, querying only a small subset of peers for each example. The gating function is trainable w.r.t to the loss and its weights act as a proxy for importance w ij ∈ W . This method has been shown to drastically increase the potential for outward bandwidth in datacenter training, [13] and has been investigated in a peer-to-peer (P2P) setting as well [5] 
Extracting knowledge
Inter-node dependence in the network is broken using distillation [6] , a compression and knowledge technique in which a smaller model -the studentmimics the behaviour of an ensemble. We employ this technique over the gating ensemble (10) where the student model learns to minimize the cross-entropy (shown below as KL) between the logits produced by the gating network and its predicted distribution. [14] distillation loss = KL D (dist(x), G(x))
We use the distilled model as proxy to cut recursive calling between each components rather than query farther into the network. If models go offline, their peers can use their distilled versions in-place. Private data can be validated over the distilled models instead of querying the network. Eventually, components can fully disconnect from the network using the distilled inputs to validate and inference the models offline. Figure 3 : Queries propagate to depth=1 before the distilled model is used.
Analysis
We consider the scenario where participants are not honestly reporting the significance of their peers. The network is progressing at discrete timesteps t and it is reasonable to assume that each participant is attempting to maximize their subjective payoff over these steps.
Payoff Model
The staking system in Section 2.4 gives participants incentive to maximize their self-weight w ii while the competitive connectivity described in Section 2.5 makes it costly for participants to decrease the remaining weights w ij in their row.
Since the row must sum to 1, we have a trade-off in two terms: (1) a utility term attached to the loss U (L(W )) and (2) the token emission via inflation τ * R i (W ). Both of these are functions of the weights and, without loss of generality, measured in similar units:
It is reasonable to assume payoff maximizing participants will use P i as their objective during training. This can be computed using standard tools since both terms U (L i (W )) and R(W ) i are fully continuous and differentiable. The system can be characterized as a competitive gradient descent game where participants are making steps ∆W i = ∂Pi ∂Wi . In appendix 6.2 we prove that this strategy is regret-free and achieves the best expected payoff in hindsight. This assumption is also generally employed in smooth markets [15] . The iterative descent thus follows:
Empirical Model
Without access to the running network we evaluate our system using an empirical model. To derive the gradient steps in this model ∂Pi ∂Wi we make the following assumptions: (1) the utility functions are continuous-differentiable and can be approximated by their first order derivatives ∂U ∂L = α and (2) the network is converged to a local minimum in the inputs ∂L ∂F = 0. The first assumption is approximate for small changes of continuous functions and the second assumption is realistic after extended training. In Appendix 6.2 we derive the following gradient step:
Here F W is the masked inputs from Section 2.5. (F W −F W0 ) is the difference in the mask between the choice of weights W and the weights at the minimum W 0 and H(L(F )) is the [n×n] hessian of the loss over inputs F . This formulation is both (1) intuitive: the gradient term ∂L ∂W measures the change in loss for any choice of weights, and (2) useful: it allows us to compute the ranking for simulated hessian terms.
The remainder of the network is deterministic, and can be described by a choice of θ = [α, τ, λ, n, σ, T, S, W, H]. For instance, the secondary term, ∂R ∂W can be computed-directly from Section 2.4 and only depends on the stake vector S and weights W .
• n: The number of nodes e.g. n=100.
• α: The first order utility derivative ∂U ∂L = α. • τ : The block-inflation rate: S t+1 = S t + τ * R.
• λ: The weight matrix learning rate: W t+1 = W t + λ∆W . 
Experiments
To generate sample statistics from the network, we first select [α, τ, λ, S, σ, T, n] ∈ θ, then we generate random positive semi-definite hessians H, and random uniform initial weights W 0 . For each parameterization we discover the competitive ranking by converging the system to a Nash-equilibrium: an equilibrium where no individual can vary from their set of weights and stand to gain. [16] To find these equilibrium, we use competitive descent strategy described in (14) and compute the gradient terms from (15) . In each trial we use a learning rate λ = 0.005 and stop when the gradient terms are bounded by or the steps exceed 1000 × n. The competitive ranking R * at this point follows from (4) and can be compared to the idealized score in R from (2) .
We are interested in the correlation between R * and R as we vary the ratio α and τ , this ratio is explicit in (15) where the fraction relates the two gradient terms. Intuitively the ratio is between the value of minimizing the loss and maximizing revenue from inflation. Since this effects the ranking, we show this trade-off for various choices in Figure 4 .
Finally, in Figure-5 we implement an adaptive-τ strategy where the network varies the inflation rate. Initial inflation is zero and then increases until the weights begins to converge towards the main diagonal w ii = 1. We measure the sparsity sparsity = sum(W dg )/sum(W ), the ratio between the main diagonal and the remaining weights. As sparsity increases we push the market equilibrium by decreasing τ . Figure shows this adaptive convergence for α = 1 with a sparsity target of 1. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the idealized rank and the competitive rank as a function of α τ . Figure-4 -a, α τ = 1 shows the case where this ratio negatively effects the ranking accuracy. Here, all components have set w ii = 1 Figure 4 : Correlations between the competitive rank and coordinated rank for α τ ∈ {1, 10, 25, 50}. For low values of α τ the weights converge to the identity: the state where peers are fully disconnected. and the resulting scores for all participants has converged to 1/n. When this occurs, the system could decrease the inflation rate τ and push the network towards the high information markets seen in Figure-4 Figure-5 shows a basic implementation of this where τ adapts to the ratio between the row-sums and the main-diagonal. By lowering inflation, it subsequently 'costs less' to connect with peers. Profit maximizing nodes automatically adjust to the change and the system converges back towards an accurate ranking. Those with high ranks will oppose inflation decreased, while those with low ranks will welcome it. The equilibrium found in this meta game will most certainly depend on the number of participants, key to both the ranking accuracy and the market at its core. However, we leave this analysis for a follow up paper. Figure 5 : (i) Left: the ratio between the main diagonal and the remainder of the weights. Right: the adaptive τ parameter converging onto the target. The weight matrix sparsity is a proxy for the ranking accuracy which we see in Figure 4 . As sparsity converges onto the target the ranking is also improving.
Discussion
-b, 4-c, & 4-d.
Conclusion
We have proposed an inter-model benchmark that can run in a P2P setting outside of a trusted environment. We started with a typical machine learning framework defined by a set of functions with their losses over given datasets, then derived an idealized ranking score. The measure produced an information theoretic score that new participants can improve by learning how to be useful to their peers. However, the system is incomplete without a mechanism that prevents participants from ranking dishonestly. To resolve this, we proposed an incentive scheme and a differential allocation system over the network weights. The system allows the participants to train for connectivity in the graph. Following this, we described how to increase the outward bandwidth in the system using a trainable gating network and how to cut independence between nodes using distillation. Finally we showed how increasing the number of nodes in the system and fixing the inflation mechanism properly ensured that the resulting rank scores would correlate with those found in a idealized setting. While this is true, stake in the system holds value as a means to drive what the network learns. That benchmark is continually being solved by the participants, compounding what has been learned before and making it available to new learners in the system. 6 Appendix 6.1 Deriving the idealized ranking.
We approximate the change in the benchmark ∆B at a local minimum under a perturbation ∆F (x) i = [..., −f i (x), ...] reflecting the removal of the i th node.
(17) follows from the definition of the benchmark B and (18) follows from a Taylor series under the perturbation ∆F (x) i . Note that the first term ∂Li ∂F is zero at the local minimum and the higher order term O(∆F 3 i ) can be ignored for sufficiently small perturbations. These assumptions are also made by [10] and [11] . Note that L i is an expectation over the dataset D i , and all terms are evaluated at a point x so we have:
Here the hessian over the error function H(Q i (x)) and the summation over the dataset x∈Di have been appropriately substituted. The constant factor 1 2 can be removed and this leaves our result.
6.2 Deriving the weight convergence game.
Theorem
For choice of Hessians H(L(F )) the network convergence-game can be described with the following linear relationship between gradient terms:
With the gradient of the loss:
Setup
We analyze the system by characterizing the behaviour of participants via their payoff in two terms (1) the utility attached to that participant's loss as a function of their weights U (L(W )). U is assumed roughly linear for small change in the weight matrix, U (L) = α * L, and ∂U ∂L = α and (2) the network is converged to a local minimum in the inputs ∂L ∂F = 0. From the payoff formulation in 6.3 we write:
Note, the utility function and emission were measured in similar units and so α is the price of each unit change in loss. The analysis just supposes such a score exists, not that it can be computed. Participants are selecting their weights by making gradient steps ∆W i = ∂Pi ∂Wi = ∂Ui ∂Wi + τ * ∂Ri ∂Wi as to maximize their local payoff. For brevity we omit the subscript i for the remainder of the analysis. Consider a Taylor expansion of the loss under a change ∆F in the inputs.
The first linear term ∂L ∂F is zero and the higher order terms are removed for sufficiently small perturbations in F . We then perform a change of variable F = F W0 , and ∆F = F W1 − F W0 where is W 0 are the current set of weights and W 1 are another choice such that F W0 and F W1 are those inputs masked by W 0 and W 1 according to (7) . Substituting this into (23):
The function L(F W1 ) is simply an approximation of the loss for any choice of weights W 1 given that the network has converged under W 0 . Finally, by the α-linear assumption of the utility we can attain the following:
Note that we've dropped the subscript W 1 , L(F W0 )) is constant not depending on the choice of weights, and the fraction 1 2 has been removed. The remaining term ∂R ∂W is derivable via the ranking ranking function in Section 2.3. Finally, dividing both terms by τ shows the result:
6.5 Deriving the ex-post zero-regret step.
Consider the system described above. A set of n nodes are changing the weights in the ranking matrix W iteratively using gradient descent with learning rate λ. W t+1 = W t + λ∆W . Here, the change of weights is ∆W = [∆w 0 , ..., ∆w n ] where each ∆w i is the weight change pushed by node i. Each node is attempting to competitively maximize it's payoff as a function of the weights P i (W ).
Definition
The ex-post regret for a single step is the maximum difference in loss between the chosen step ∆w i and all alternative ∆w * i . The expected ex-post regret is this difference in expectation, where the expectation is taken over all choices ∆w j 's chosen by other participants [16] .
Theorem
For sufficiently small λ, the expected ex-post regret for strategy ∆w i = ∂P ∂wi is 0.
Proof
Consider Taylor's theorem at the point W for the payoff function P under a change in weights W * = W + λ∆W . There exists a function h(W * ) such that in the limit as, W * → W we have the exact equivalence:
Let P (W * ) represent the payoff when the weight change of the i th row is ∆W i = ∂P ∂Wi , and let P (W * ) be any other choice. By the definition of regret, and Taylors theorem as λ → 0, we have:
This follows by subtracting (29) with choice W * and W * . Next, substituting W * − W = −λ∆W and expanding ∂P ∂W ∆W = [ ∂P ∂W0 * ∆W 0 , ... ∂P ∂Wn * ∆W n ] into the equation above leaves:
The constant λ can be removed and the second term depends only on weights of other rows W j =i . These can be removed under the expectation E ∆Wj . He have:
Finally, we use the the fact that for vectors a, b and angle between them θ the magnitude of the dot product is |a||b|cosθ. This is maximized when the vectors are parallel θ = 0 and cos(θ) = 1, or ∆W i = κ * ∂P ∂Wi for some constant κ > 0. Thus P (∆W * ) is maximize when ∆W * i = κ * ∂P ∂Wi . Since P (∆W * ) = P (∆W * ) in the maximum, this proves the point.
